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Appendix A Completion and the Cabalar Semantics
The following deﬁnitions are from (Bartholomew and Lee 2013).
We say that a formula F is in Clark normal form (relative to a list c of intensional constants)
if it is a conjunction of sentences of the form
8x(G ! p(x)) (A1)
and
8xy(G ! f(x)=y) (A2)
one for each intensional predicate p and each intensional function f, where x is a list of distinct
object variables, y is an object variable, and G is an arbitrary formula that has no free variables
other than those in x and y.
The completion of a formula F in Clark normal form (relative to c) is obtained from F by
replacing each conjunctive term (A1) with
8x(p(x) $ G)
and each conjunctive term (A2) with
8xy(f(x)=y $ G):
An occurrence of a symbol or a subformula in a formula F is called strictly positive in F if
that occurrence is not in the antecedent of any implication in F. The dependency graph of F
(relative to c) is the directed graph that
 has all members of c as its vertices, and
 has an edge from c to d if, for some strictly positive occurrence of G ! H in F,
— c has a strictly positive occurrence in H, and
— d has a strictly positive occurrence in G.
We say that F is tight (on c) if the dependency graph of F (relative to c) is acyclic.
The following theorem relates the Cabalar semantics to completion, which follows immedi-
ately from Theorem 12 from (Bartholomew and Lee 2013) and Theorem 6.2
Theorem 11
For any sentence F in Clark normal form that is tight on c and any total interpretation I, if
I j= 9xy(x 6= y), then I j= p CBL[F;c] iff I j= SM[F;c] iff I is a model of the completion of F
relative to c.
Appendix B Review of the Balduccini Semantics
The following is a review of the Balduccini semantics. Let us restrict a signature  to be com-
prised of a set of intensional function and predicate constants denoted c as well as a set of
non-intensional object constants  n c.
Balduccini considered terms to have the form f(c1;:::;ck) where f is an intensional function
constant (in c), and each ci is a non-intensional object constant (in nc). He considered an atom
to be an expression p(c1;:::;ck) where p is an intensional predicate constant, and each ci is a
non-intensional object constant; a t-atom is an expression of the form f = g where f is a term
and g is either a term or a non-intensional object constant; a seed t-atom is a t-atom of the form
f = c where c is a non-intensional object constant. A t-literal is a t-atom f = g or (f = g),
where  denotes strong negation. A seed literal is an atom a, or a, or a seed t-atom. A literal
is an atom a, or a, or a t-literal. An ASPffg program consists of rules of the form
h   l1;:::;lm;not lm+1;:::;not ln ; (B1)
where h is a seed literal or ?, and each li is a literal. An ASPffg program is a ﬁnite set of rules.
We identify rule (B1) with an implication
l1 ^  ^ lm ^ :lm+1 ^  ^ :ln ! h ;
and an ASPffg program as the conjunction of all rules in it. Note that ASPffg programs do not
contain variables, and can be viewed as a special case of head-c-plain formulas.
A set I of seed literals is said to be consistent if it contains no pair of an atom a and its strong
negation a; and contains no pair of seed t-atoms t = c1 and t = c2 such that c1 6= c2. It is clear
that any subset of a consistent set of seed literals is consistent as well.
The notion of satisfaction between a consistent set I of seed literals and literals, denoted by
j=
b, is deﬁned as follows.
 For a seed literal l, I j=
b l if l 2 I;
 For a non-seed literal f =g, I j= b f =g if I contains both f =c and g=c for some object
constant c;
 For a non-seed literal (f = g), I j= b(f = g) if I contains both f = c1 and g = c2 for
some object constants c1 and c2 such that c1 6= c2.
This notion of satisfaction is extended to formulas allowing ^, : and   as in classical logic.
The reduct of an ASPffg program  relative to a consistent set I of seed literals is denoted I
and is deﬁned as
I = fh   l1 :::;lm j (B1) 2  and I j= :lm+1 ^  ^ :lng :
I is called a Balduccini answer set of  if
 I j=
b I, and,
 for every proper subset J of I, we have J 6j=
b I.3
Appendix C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Wewilloftenusethefollowingnotation.Let beaﬁrst-ordersignature,letcbeasetofconstants
that is a subset of , and let d be a set of constants not belonging to  and is similar to c.1 Jc
d
denotes the interpretation of signature ( n c) [ d obtained from J by replacing every constant
from c with the corresponding constant from d. For two interpretations I and J of  that agree
on all constants in  n c, we deﬁne Jc
d [ I to be the interpretation from the extended signature
 [ d such that
 Jc
d [ I agrees with I on all constants in c;
 Jc
d [ I agrees with Jc
d on all constants in d;
 Jc
d [ I agrees with both I and J on all constants in  n c.
Lemma 1
For any sentence F of signature  and any interpretations I and J of ,
(a) if Jc
d [ I j= F(d), then I j= F;
(b) if hJ;Ii j=
fht F, then hI;Ii j=
fht F.
Proof. By induction on F.
Lemma 2
Let F be a sentence of signature , and let I and J be interpretations of  such that J <c I. We
have Jc
d [ I j= F(d) iff J j= grI[F]I.
Proof. By induction on F.
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. Then F(d) is F(d) ^ F, where F(d) is obtained from F
by replacing the members of c with the corresponding members of d. Consider the following
subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j= F. Then Jc
d [ I 6j= F(d). Further, grI[F]I = ?, so J 6j= grI[F]I.
 Subcase2:I j= F.ThenJc
d[I j= F(d)iffJc
d j= F(d)iffJ j= F.Further,grI[F]I = F,
so J j= grI[F]I iff J j= F.
Case 2: F is G ^ H or G _ H. The claim follows immediately from I.H. on G and H.
Case 3: F is G ! H. Then F(d) = (G(d) ! H(d)) ^ (G ! H). Consider the following
subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j= G ! H. Then Jc
d [I 6j= F(d). Further, grI[F]I = ?, which J does not
satisfy.
 Subcase 2: I j= G ! H. Then Jc
d [ I j= F(d) iff Jc
d [ I j= G(d) ! H(d). On the
other hand, grI[F]I = grI[G]I ! grI[H]I so this case holds by I.H. on G and H.
Case 4: F is 9xG(x). By I.H., Jc
d [ I j= G()(d) iff J j= grI[G()]I for each  2 jIj. The
claim follows immediately.
Case 5: F is 8xG(x). Similar to Case 4.
1 That is to say, d and c have the same length and the corresponding members are either predicate constants of the same
arity or function constants of the same arity.4
Lemma 3
For any interpretations I and J of signature , we have Jc
d [ I j= d < c iff J <c I.
Proof. Recall that by deﬁnition, d < c is
(dpred  cpred) ^ :(d = c);
and by deﬁnition, J <c I is
 J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants not in c;
 pJ  pI for all predicate constants p in c; and
 J and I do not agree on c.
First, by the deﬁnition of Jc
d [ I, J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants
in  n c.
Second, by deﬁnition, Jc
d [ I j= dpred  cpred iff, for every predicate constant p in c,
Jc
d [ I j= 8x(p(x)c
d ! p(x)); 2
which is equivalent to saying that (pc
d)J
c
d[I  pJ
c
d[I. Since I does not interpret any constant
from d, and Jc
d does not interpret any constant from c, this is equivalent to (pc
d)J
c
d  pI and
further to pJ  pI.
Third, since I does not interpret any constant from d and Jc
d does not interpret any constant
from c, Jc
d [ I j= :(d = c) is equivalent to saying that J and I do not agree on c.
Theorem 1 Let F be a ﬁrst-order sentence of signature  and c be a list of intensional constants.
For any interpretation I of , I j= SM[F;c] iff
 I satisﬁes F, and
 every interpretation J such that J <c I does not satisfy (grI[F])I.
Proof. I j= SM[F;c] is by deﬁnition
I j= F ^ :9b c(b c < c ^ F(b c)): (C1)
The ﬁrst item, “I satisﬁes F”, is equivalent to the ﬁrst conjunctive term of (C1).
By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the second item, “no interpretation J of  such that J <c I
satisﬁes grI[F]I”, is equivalent to the second conjunctive term in (C1).
C.2 Proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3
Recall the deﬁnition: J c I if
 J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants not in c;
 pJ  pI for all predicate constants in c; and
 fJ() = u or fJ() = fI() for all function constants in c and all lists  of elements in
the universe.
As before, let d be a list of constants that is similar to c and is disjoint from . The notion of
Jc
d [ I is straightforwardly extended to the case when J and I are partial interpretations.
2 p(x)c
d denotes the atom that is obtained from p(x) by replacing p with the corresponding member of d if p 2 c, and
no change otherwise.5
Lemma 4
For any partial interpretations I and J of signature , we have J c I iff Jc
d [ I j=
p d  c.
Proof. By the deﬁnition of Jc
d [ I, J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants
in  n c, which is the ﬁrst condition of J c I.
Recall the deﬁnition: d  c is
(dpred  cpred) ^ (dfunc  cfunc):
Jc
d [ I j= p dpred  cpred iff, for every predicate constant p in c,
Jc
d [ I j=
p 8x(p(x)c
d ! p(x));
which is equivalent to saying that (pc
d)J
c
d[I  pJ
c
d[I. Since I does not interpret any constant
from d and Jc
d does not interpret any constant from c, this is equivalent to (pc
d)J
c
d  pI and
further to pJ  pI, which is the second condition of J c I.
Jc
d [ I j=
p (dfunc  cfunc) iff, for every function constant f in c,
Jc
d [ I j= p 8x((f(x)c
d 6= f(x)c
d) _ (f(x)c
d = f(x)));
which is equivalent to saying that fJ() = u or fJ() = fI() for all , the third condition of
J c I.
Lemma 5
For any partial interpretations I and J of signature , we have J c I iff Jc
d [ I j=
p d  c.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4 since
 J c I iff J c I and not I c J, and
 Jc
d [ I j=
p d  c iff Jc
d [ I j=
p d  c and Jc
d [ I 6j=
p c  d.
Lemma 6
For any sentence F of signature  and any partial interpretations I and J of  such that J c I,
(a) if Jc
d [ I j=
p Fy(d), then I j=
p F;
(b) if hJ;Ii j= pht F, then hI;Ii j= pht F.
Proof. Each of (a) and (b) can be proved by induction on F.
We will show only the case when F is an atomic sentence. The other cases are straightforward:
Part (a): Let F be an atomic sentence. Assume Jc
d [ I j=
p Fy(d), i.e., J j=
p F.
 Subcase 1: F is of the form p(t). Since J c I, it follows that I j=
p F.
 Subcase 2: F is of the form t1 = t2. Since Jc
d [I j=
p F(d), tJ
1 = tJ
2 6= u. From J c I, it
follows that tI
1 = tI
2 6= u, i.e., I j= p F.
Part (b): Let F be an atomic sentence. Assume hJ;Ii j=
pht F, i.e., hJ;Ii;h j=
pht F
 Subcase 1: F is of the form p(t). Since J c I, it follows that hJ;Ii;t j= pht F.
 Subcase 2: F is of the form t1 = t2. Since hJ;Ii;h j=
pht F, tJ
1 = tJ
2 6= u. From J c I, it
follows that tI
1 = tI
2 6= u, i.e., hJ;Ii;t j=
pht F.6
Lemma 7
Let F be a sentence of signature , and let I and J be partial interpretations of  such that
J c I. We have J j=
p grI[F]I iff hJ;Ii j=
pht F.
Proof. By induction on F.
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. Clearly, grI[F] is F.
 Subcase 1: I 6j=
p F. Then grI[F]I is ?, and J 6j=
p ?. Further, since hI;Ii 6j=
pht F, by
Lemma 6 (b), it follows that hJ;Ii 6j=
pht F.
 Subcase 2: I j=
p F. Then grI[F]I is F. It is clear that J j=
p F iff hJ;Ii j=
pht F.
Case 2: F is G ^ H or G _ H. The claim follows immediately from I.H. on G and H.
Case 3: F is G ! H. Consider the following subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j=
p G ! H. grI[G ! H]I is ?, and J 6j=
p ?. Further, hI;Ii 6j=
p G ! H. By
Lemma 6 (b), hJ;Ii 6j=
p G ! H.
 Subcase 2: I j=
p G ! H. grI[G ! H]I is equivalent to grI[G]I ! grI[H]I. Further,
hJ;Ii j=
pht G ! H is equivalent to saying that hJ;Ii 6j=
pht G or hJ;Ii j=
pht H. Then the claim
follows from I.H. on G and H.
Case 4: F is 8xG(x), or 9xG(x). By induction on G() for each  in the universe.
Theorem 2 Let F be a ﬁrst-order sentence of signature  and let c be a list of intensional
constants. For any partial interpretation I of , hI;Ii is a partial equilibrium model of F iff
 I j=
p F, and
 for every partial interpretation J of  such that J c I, we have J 6j=
p grI[F]I.
Proof. Clearly, I j=
p F iff hI;Ii j=
pht F. By Lemma 7, for every partial interpretation J of 
such that J c I, J 6j= p grI[F]I iff hJ;Ii 6j= pht F.
Lemma 8
Let F be a sentence of signature , and let I and J be partial interpretations of . We have
Jc
d [ I j=
p Fy(d) iff hJ;Ii j=
pht F.
Proof. By induction on F.
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. Fy(d) is F(d). Jc
d [ I j= p F(d) iff J j= p F iff hJ;Ii;h j= pht F
iff hJ;Ii j=
pht F.
Case 2: F is G ^ H or G _ H. Follows by I.H. on G and H.
Case 3: F is G ! H. Consider the following subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j=
p G ! H. Clearly, Jc
d [ I 6j=
p G ! H and hJ;Ii 6j=
pht G ! H.
 Subcase 2: I j=
p G ! H. Then Jc
d [ I j=
p (G ! H)y(d) iff Jc
d [ I j=
p Gy(d) ! Hy(d).
Further, hJ;Ii j=
pht G ! H is equivalent to saying that hJ;Ii 6j=
pht G or hJ;Ii j=
pht H. Then
the claim follows from I.H. on G and H.7
Case 4: F is 8xG(x), or 9xG(x). By induction on G() for each  in the universe.
Theorem 3 For any sentence F, a PHT-interpretation hI;Ii is a partial equilibrium model of F
relative to c iff I j=
p CBL[F;c].
Proof. By deﬁnition, CBL[F;c] is
F ^ :9b c(b cc ^ Fy(b c)):
Clearly, I j=
p F iff hI;Ii j=
pht F. From Lemma 5 and Lemma 8, it follows that I j=
p :9b c(b c 
c ^ Fy(b c)) iff there is no interpretation J of  such that J c I and hJ;Ii j=
pht F.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Lemma 9
Let F be a sentence of signature  and let I and J be interpretations of  such that J <c I. We
have J j= grI[F]I iff hJ;Ii j=
fht F.
Proof. By induction on F.
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. grI[F] is F.
 Subcase 1: I 6j= F. Then grI[F]I is ?, which J does not satisfy. Further, since hJ;Ii;t 6j=
fht
F, hJ;Ii 6j= fht F.
 Subcase 2: I j= F. Then grI[F]I is F, and hJ;Ii;t j=
fht F. It is clear that J j= F iff
hJ;Ii;h j= fht F.
Case 2: F is G ^ H or G _ H. The claim follows immediately from I.H. on G and H.
Case 3: F is G ! H. Consider the following subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j= G ! H. Then grI[G ! H]I is ?, which J does not satisfy. Further,
hI;Ii 6j=
fht G ! H. By Lemma 1 (b), hJ;Ii 6j=
fht G ! H.
 Subcase 2: I j= G ! H. Then grI[G ! H]I is equivalent to grI[G]I ! grI[H]I.
Further, hJ;Ii j=
fht G ! H is equivalent to saying that hJ;Ii 6j=
fht G or hJ;Ii j=
fht H. Then
the claim follows from I.H. on G and H.
Case 4: F is 8xG(x), or 9xG(x). By induction on G() for each  in the universe.
Theorem 4 Let F be a ﬁrst-order sentence of signature  and c be a list of predicate and function
constants. For any interpretation I of , I j= SM[F;c] iff
 hI;Ii j=
fht F, and
 for every interpretation J of  such that J <c I, we have hJ;Ii 6j=
fht F.
Proof. We use Theorem 1 to refer to the reduct-based reformulation and instead show
 I satisﬁes F, and
 every interpretation J such that J <c I does not satisfy (grI[F])I
iff8
 hI;Ii j=
fht F, and
 for every interpretation J of  such that J <c I, we have hJ;Ii 6j=
fht F.
Clearly, I j= F iff hI;Ii j=
fht F. By Lemma 9, for every interpretation J such that J <c I, we
have J 6j= (grI[F])I iff hJ;Ii 6j=
fht F.
C.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Lemma 10
Let F be a c-plain sentence of signature , let I, K be total interpretations of , and let J be a
partial interpretation of  such that
 J c I and K <c I;
 pJ = pK for every predicate constant;
 fJ() = u iff fK() 6= fI() for every function constant f and every  2 jIjn where n
is the arity of f.
We have K j= grI[F]I iff J j=
p grI[F]I.
Proof.
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence of the form p(t). Since F is c-plain, t contains no constants
from c, and by the assumption J c I and K <c I, we have tJ = tK = tI. Since J and K
agree on p, the claim holds.
Case 2: F is an atomic sentence of the form f(t) = t1.
 Subcase 1: I 6j= f(t) = t1. Then grI[F]I is ?, so the claim holds.
 Subcase 2: I j= f(t) = t1. Then grI[F]I is f(t) = t1. Further, from the assumption that
F is c-plain, t and t1 contain no constants from c, and by the assumptions that J c I,
K <c I and that I is total, we have tJ = tK = tI 6= u and tJ
1 = tK
1 = tI
1 6= u.
Either f(t)J 6= u or f(t)J = u. In the ﬁrst case, since J c I, we have f(t)J = f(t)I.
Also, by the assumption on K, f(t)K = f(t)I. Consequently, J j=
p f(t) = t1 and
K j= f(t) = t1.
In the second case, J 6j=
p f(t) = t1. Also, by the assumption on K, f(t)K 6= f(t)I =
tI
1 = tK
1 , so K 6j= f(t) = t1.
The other cases are straightforward.
Recall the deﬁnitions: for two classical interpretations I, K of the same signature  with the
same universe and a list c of distinct predicate and function constants, we write K <c I if
K and I agree on all constants in  n c, (C2)
pK  pI for all predicates p in c, and (C3)
K and I do not agree on c. (C4)
Similarly,fortwopartialinterpretationsJ andI ofthesamesignature overthesameuniverse
jIj, and a set of constants c, J c I is equivalent to
J and I agree on all constants in  n c, (C5)
pJ  pI for all predicates p in c, and (C6)
J and I do not agree on c (C7)9
with the additional requirement that
for every function constant f 2 c, and every  2 jIjn where n
is the arity of f, fI() = fJ() or fJ() = u.
(C8)
If we drop (C7), this is equivalent to J c I.
Lemma 11
Let F be a c-plain sentence of signature , and let I be total interpretation of  that satisﬁes
9xy(x 6= y). There is a partial interpretation J such that J c I and J j=
p grI[F]I iff there is a
total interpretation K such that K <c I and K j= grI[F]I.
Proof. Left-to-right: Let J be a partial interpretation such that J c I and J j=
p grI[F]I. We
construct the total interpretation K as follows. For each constant d not in c, dK = dJ = dI. For
each predicate constant p in c and each  2 jIjn where n is the arity of p,
pK() = pJ() ;
and, for each function constant f in c and each  2 jIjn where n is the arity of f,
fK() =

fI() if fJ() 6= u;
m(fI()) otherwise
where m is a mapping m : jIj ! jIj such that 8x(m(x) 6= x) (note that such a mapping requires
I j= 9xy(x 6= y)).
We now show that K <c I. It is immediate from the assumption J c I and by deﬁnition that
(C2) and (C3) hold. Consider the following cases.
 Case 1: For every function constant f 2 c and every  2 jIjn where n is the arity of f,
fJ() = fI() (note that since I is total, these cannot be u). From (C7), it follows that
there is at least one predicate constant p in c such that pJ  pI. However, by the deﬁnition
of K, pK  pI and so (C4) holds.
 Case 2: There is some function constant f 2 c and some  2 jIjn where n is the arity of f
such that fJ() 6= fI(). From (C8), it follows that fJ() = u and thus by the deﬁnition
of K, fK() = m(fI()) 6= fI() and so (C4) holds.
By Lemma 10, the fact K j= grI[F]I follows from the assumption J j= p grI[F]I.
Right-to-left: Let K be a total interpretation such that K <c I and K j= grI[F]I. We construct
the partial interpretation J as follows. For each constant d not in c, dK = dJ = dI. For each
predicate constant p in c and each  2 jIjn where n is the arity of p,
pJ() = pK() ;
and, for each function constant f in c and each  2 jIjn where n is the arity of f,
fJ() =

fI() if fK() = fI();
u otherwise.
We now show that J c I. It is immediate from the assumption that K <c I and by deﬁnition
that (C5) and (C6) hold. Consider the following cases.
 Case 1: For every function constant f 2 c and every  2 jIjn where n is the arity of f,
fK() = fI(). By the deﬁnition of J, fJ() = fI() and so (C8) holds. Now since10
(C4) holds, there is at least one predicate constant p such that pK  pI. However, by the
deﬁnition of J, pJ  pI and so (C7) holds.
 Case 2: There is some function constant f 2 c and some  2 jIjn where n is the arity of
f such that fK() 6= fI(). For such a function f, by the deﬁnition of J, it must be that
fJ() = u. For other functions f0 2 c such that (f0)K(
0) = (f0)I(
0) for every 
0, as in
Case 1, we conclude (f0)J() = (f0)I(). Consequently, (C8) and (C7) both hold.
By Lemma 10, the fact J j=
p grI[F]I follows from the assumption K j= grI[F]I.
Theorem 5 For any c-plain sentence F of signature , any list c of intensional constants, and
any total interpretation I of  satisfying 9xy(x 6= y), I j= SM[F;c] iff I j=
p CBL[F;c].
Proof. We use Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 to refer to the grounding and reduct based deﬁnitions
rather than the second-order logic based deﬁnitions. The claim follows from Lemma 11.
C.5 Proof of Theorem 7 and Corollary 1
Lemma 12
For any partial interpretation I and any atomic sentence p(t1;:::;tk) and f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk,
(a) I j=
p p(t1;:::;tk) iff
I j= p 9xn1 :::xnj(p(t1;:::;tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^  ^ tnj = xnj)
where fn1;:::;njg  f1;:::;kg and p(t1;:::;tk)00 is obtained from p(t1;:::;tk) by
replacing each tni in p(t1;:::;tk) with xni.
(b) I j=
p f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk iff
I j=
p 9xn1 :::xnj((f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^  ^ tnj = xnj)
wherefn1;:::;njg  f1;:::;kgand(f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk)00 isobtainedfromf(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk
by replacing each tni in f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk with xni.
Proof. Consider the following cases.
Case1: tI
i = uforsomei 2 fn1;:::;njg.Clearly,I 6j=
p p(t1;:::;tk)andI 6j=
p f(t1;:::;tk 1) =
tk. It is also the case that I 6j=
p ti = 
 for any  2 jIj so we have
I 6j=
p 9xn1 :::xnj(p(t1;:::;tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^  ^ tnj = xnj) (C9)
and
I 6j=
p 9xn1 :::xnj((f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^  ^ tnj = xnj) : (C10)
Case 2: tI
i = u for some i 2 f1;:::;kg n fn1;:::;njg. Clearly, I 6j=
p p(t1;:::;tk) and I 6j=
p
f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk. Also, since ti remains in p(t1;:::;tk)00 and (f(t1;:::;tk) = t)00, we have
I 6j= p p(t1;:::;tk)00 and I 6j= p (f(t1;:::;tk) = t)00, from which (C9) and (C10) follow.
Case 3: tI
i 6= u for all i 2 f1;:::;kg. Condition (a) clearly holds because it coincides with
classical equivalence. For Condition (b), consider two subcases:
 Subcase 1: f(t1;:::;tk 1)I 6= u. Clearly, Condition (b) coincides with classical equiva-
lence.11
 Subcase 2: f(t1;:::;tk 1)I = u. Clearly, I 6j=
p f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk. Now in
9xn1 :::xnj((f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^  ^ tnj = xnj);
there is only one set of values for xn1 :::xnj that satisﬁes the last j conjunctive terms—
when xni is mapped to tI
ni. However, for this set of values, ((f(t1;:::;tk 1))00)I =
f(t1;:::;tk 1)I = u (where (f(t1;:::;tk 1))00 is obtained from f(t1;:::;tk 1) by re-
placing each tni with xni) so (C10) holds.
Lemma 13
Given a sentence F, a set of constants c, and a partial interpretation I, we have I j=
p F iff
I j=
p UFc(F).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of unfolding that needs to be done. More
precisely, for any formula F, we deﬁne NUc(F) (“Needed Unfolding”) as follows.
 NUc(p(t1;:::;tk)) = 
0 if p(t1;:::;tk) is c-plain;
max(NUc(t1 = x);:::;NUc(tk = x)) + 1 otherwise.
 NUc(f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk) = 
0 if f(t1;:::;tk 1) = tk is c-plain;
max(NUc(t1 = x);:::;NUc(tk = x)) + 1 otherwise.
 NUc(G  H) = max(NUc(G);NUc(H)) + 1, where  2 f^;_;!g.
 NUc(QxG) = NUc(G) + 1, where Q 2 f8;9g.
Case 1: F is a c-plain atomic sentence. F is identical to UFc(F) so the claim holds.
Case 2: F is p(t) where t contains at least one constant from c. Let tn1 :::tnj be the j terms
in t containing at least one constant from c. Now UFc(F) is 9xn1 :::xnj(p(t1;:::;tk)00 ^
UFc(tn1 = xn1)^^UFc(tnj = xnj)) where p(t1;:::;tk)00 is obtained from p(t1;:::;tk) by
replacing each tni in p(t1;:::;tk) with xni. Since NUc(F) > NUc(tni = 
) for each  2 jIj
and each i 2 f1;:::;jg, by I.H. on tni = 
, UFc(tni = xni) can be replaced by tni = xni
so that I j=
p UFc(F) iff I j=
p 9xn1 :::xnj(p(t1;:::;tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^  ^ tnj = xnj). By
Lemma 12 the latter is equivalent to I j=
p F.
Case 3: F is f(t) = t1 where at least one of t and t1 contain at least one constant from c. Let
tn1 :::tnj be the j terms in t and t1 containing at least one constant from c. Now UFc(F) is
9xn1 :::xnj((f(t) = t1)00 ^ UFc(tn1 = xn1) ^  ^ UFc(tnj = xnj)), where (f(t) = t1)00
is obtained from f(t) = t1 by replacing each tni in f(t) = t1 with xni. Since NUc(F) >
NUc(tni = 
) for each  2 jIj and each i 2 f1;:::;jg, by I.H. on tni = 
, UFc(tni = xni)
can be replaced by tni = xni so that I j=
p UFc(F) iff I j=
p 9xn1 :::xnj((f(t) = t1)00 ^ tn1 =
xn1 ^  ^ tnj = xnj). By Lemma 12 the latter is equivalent to I j=
p F.
Case 4: F is G  H for  2 f^;_;!g. By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is QxF(x) for Q 2 f8;9g. By I.H. on F(
) for each  2 jIj.
Theorem 7 For any sentence F, any list c of constants, and any partial interpretation I, we have
I j=
p CBL[F;c] iff I j=
p CBL[UFc(F);c].12
Proof. By deﬁnition, CBL[F;c] is
F ^ :9b c(b cc ^ Fy(b c))
and CBL[UFc(F);c] is by deﬁnition
UFc(F) ^ :9b c(b cc ^ (UFc(F))y(b c)):
Now, for any partial interpretation I of signature   c, by Lemma 13, I j=
p F iff I j=
p UFc(F).
It is sufﬁcient to show that, for any partial interpretation J, Jc
d [ I j=
p d  c ^ Fy(d) iff
Jc
d [ I j= p d  c ^ (UFc(F))y(d).
Case1:F isanatomicsentence.Fy(d)isF(d),andUFc(F)y(d)isUFc(F)(d).Jc
d[I j=
p F(d)
iff J j=
p F. Similarly, Jc
d [ I j=
p UFc(F)(d) iff J j=
p UFc(F). By Lemma 12, J j=
p F iff
J j=
p UFc(F), so the claim follows.
Case 2: F is G  H for  2 f^;_g. By induction on G and H.
Case 3: F is G ! H. Fy(d) is (Gy(d) ! Hy(d)) ^ (G ! H) and (UFc(F))y(d) is
(UFc(G))y(d) ! (UFc(H))y(d)) ^ (UFc(G) ! UFc(H)). The equivalence between the ﬁrst
conjunctive terms (under partial satisfaction) is by I.H. on G and H, and the equivalence between
the second conjunctive terms (under partial satisfaction) is by Lemma 13.
Case 4: F is QxG(x) for Q 2 f8;9g. By I.H. on G(
) for each  2 jIj.
Corollary 1 For any sentence F, any list c of constants, and any total interpretation I satisfying
9xy(x 6= y), we have I j=
p CBL[F;c] iff I j=
p CBL[UFc(F);c] iff I j= SM[UFc(F);c].
Proof. The equivalence between the ﬁrst and the second conditions is by Theorem 7. The equiv-
alence between the second and the third conditions is by Theorem 5 since UFc(F) is c-plain.
C.6 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 For any head-c-plain sentence F of signature  that is tight on c, and any total
interpretation I of  satisfying 9xy(x 6= y), I j= SM[F;c] iff I j=
p CBL[F;c].
Proof. We ﬁrst note that since F is head-c-plain and tight on c, we can transform this into Clark
normal form that is still tight on c, so we can assume that F is already turned into this form.
By Corollary 1, I j=
p CBL[F;c] iff I j= SM[UFc(F);c], so it remains to check that I j=
SM[UFc(F);c] iff I j= SM[F;c].
It is easy to check that the completion of UFc(F) relative to c is equivalent to the comple-
tion of F relative to c. By Theorem 2 from (Bartholomew and Lee 2013), we conclude that
SM[UFc(F);c] is equivalent to SM[F;c].
C.7 Proof of Theorem 8 , Corollary 2 , and Corollary 3
Theorem 8 For any f-plain sentence F and any partial interpretation I, if
I j=
p 8xy(p(x;y) $ f(x) = y) (C11)13
then I j=
p CBL[F; f;c] iff I j=
p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c].
Proof. For any partial interpretation I of signature   ff;p;cg satisfying (C11), it is clear
that I j= p F iff I j= p Ff
p since Ff
p is simply the result of replacing all f(x) = y with p(x;y).
Thus it is sufﬁcient to show that
I j=
p 9b fb c

(b f;b c)(f;c) ^ Fy(b f;b c)

iff I j=
p 9b pb c

(b p;b c)(p;c) ^ (Ff
p )y(b p;b c)

:
Left-to-right:AssumeI j=
p 9b fb c((b f;b c)(f;c)^Fy(b f;b c)).WewishtoshowthatI j=
p 9b pb c((b p;b c)
(p;c) ^ (Ff
p )y(b p;b c)). That is, take any function g of the same arity as f and any list of predi-
cate and function constants d that is similar to c. For any partial interpretation J of signature ,
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I is an interpretation of the extended signature 0 =  [ fg;q;dg. We assume
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j= p (g;d)(f;c) ^ Fy(g;d)
and wish to show that there is a predicate q of the same arity as p such that
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j= p (q;d)(p;c) ^ (Ff
p )y(q;d):
We deﬁne the new predicate q in terms of g as follows:
q
J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I(;0) =
(
TRUE if g
J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I() = 0 ;
FALSE otherwise:
We ﬁrst show if J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j= p (g;d)(f;c) then J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j= p (q;d)(p;c).
Case 1: J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I 6j= p gf. Since we assume J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j= p (g;d)(f;c), it follows that
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p g = f ; (C12)
and J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p d  c. From (C11), (C12), and the deﬁnition of q, it follows that J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p
q = p. Consequently, J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (q;d)(p;c).
Case 2: J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p g  f. From (C11), J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p g  f, and the deﬁnition of q, it
follows that J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p q p. Since we assume J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (g;d)(f;c), it follows that
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p dc. Consequently, J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (q;d)(p;c).
We now show that J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I j=
p (Ff
p )y(q;d) by proving J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I j=
p Fy(g;d) iff J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I j=
p
(Ff
p )y(q;d).
Case 1: F is an f-plain atomic sentence of the form p(t), or t1 = t2 such that t1 does not contain
f. The claim is obvious since Ff
p is exactly F and so (Ff
p )y(q;d) is exactly Fy(g;d).
Case 2: F is an f-plain atomic sentence of the form f(t) = t1. Then Fy(g;d) is g(t0) = t0
1,
where t0 and t0
1 are obtained from t and t1 by replacing the members of c with the corresponding
members of d. Ff
p is p(t;t1), and (Ff
p )y(q;d) is q(t0;t0
1). From the deﬁnition of q, it follows
that J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p g(t0) = t0
1 $ q(t0;t0
1).
Case 3: F is G  H where  2 f^;_;!g. By I.H. on G and H.
Case 4: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8;9g. By I.H. on G() for each  2 jIj.14
Right-to-left: Assume I j=
p 9b pb c((b p;b c)  (p;c) ^ (Ff
p )y(b p;b c)). We wish to show that I j=
p
9(b f;b c)((b f;b c)(f;c) ^ Fy(b f;b c)) . That is, take any predicate q of the same arity as p and any
list of predicates and functions d that is similar to c. As before, let J be a partial interpretation
of , and J
(f;c)
(g;d) [I is an interpretation of the extended signature 0 =  [fg;q;dg. We assume
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (q;d)(p;c) ^ (Ff
p )y(q;d)
and wish to show that there is a function g of the same arity as f such that
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (g;d)(f;c) ^ Fy(g;d):
We deﬁne g
J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I in terms of q as follows:
g
J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I() =
(
f
J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I() if q
J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I(;f
J
(f;c)
(g;d)[I()) = TRUE ;
u otherwise.
We ﬁrst show that if J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (q;d)(p;c) then J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (g;d)(f;c).
Case 1: J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p q = p. Since we assume J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (q;d)  (p;c), it follows that
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p d  c. From (C11), J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p q = p, and by the deﬁnition of g, it follows that
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p g = f. Consequently, J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (g;d)(f;c).
Case 2: J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p :(q = p). Since we assume J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (q;d)(p;c), it follows that
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p qp and so we have
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p q  p : (C13)
From (C11), (C13), and the deﬁnition of g, it follows that J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p g  f. Also from the
assumption that J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (q;d)(p;c), it follows that J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p dc. Consequently,
J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p (g;d)(f;c).
We show that J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p Fy(g;d) by proving that J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p Fy(g;d) iff J
(f;c)
(g;d) [ I j=
p
(Ff
p )y(q;d). The proof is similar to the one above, and is omitted.
Corollary 2 Let F be an f-plain sentence. (a) For any partial interpretation I of the signature of
F, I j=
p CBL[F; f;c] iff If
p j=
p CBL[Ff
p ^ UCp; p;c]. (b) For any partial interpretation J of the
signature of Ff
p , J j=
p CBL[Ff
p ^ UCp; p;c] iff J = If
p for some partial interpretation I such
that I j= p CBL[F; f;c].
Proof. For two partial interpretations I of signature 1 and J of signature 2 with the same
universe, by I [ J we denote the partial interpretation of signature 1 [ 2 that interprets all
constantsoccurringonlyin1 inthesamewayasI doesandsimilarlyfor2 andJ.Forconstants
appearing in both 1 and 2, I must interpret these the same as J does, in which case I [J also
interprets the constants in this way.
Part (a), Left-to-right: Assume I j=
p CBL[F; f;c]. By the deﬁnition of If
p, I[If
p j=
p (C11). Thus
by Theorem 8, I[If
p j=
p CBL[F; f;c] $ CBL[Ff
p ; p;c]. Since we assume I j=
p CBL[F; f;c], it
is the case that I[If
p j= p CBL[F; f;c] and thus it must be the case that I[If
p j= p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c].15
Further, (C11) entails UCp, so I [ If
p j=
p UCp. Since the signature of I does not contain p,
we conclude If
p j=
p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c] ^ UCp and since UCp is comprised of constraints, If
p j=
p
CBL[Ff
p ^ UCp; p;c].3
Part (a), Right-to-left: Assume If
p j=
p CBL[Ff
p ^ UCp; p;c]. By the deﬁnition of If
p, I [ If
p j=
p
(C11). Thus by Theorem 8, I [ If
p j= p CBL[F; f;c] $ CBL[Ff
p ; p;c]. From the assumption,
we have If
p j=
p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c], and further I [ If
p j=
p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c]. Consequently, I [ If
p j=
p
CBL[F; f;c], and since the signature of If
p does not contain f, we conclude I j= p CBL[F; f;c].
Part (b), Left-to-right: Assume J j=
p CBL[Ff
p ^ UCp; p;c]. Let I = J
p
f where J
p
f denotes the
partial interpretation of the signature of F obtained from J by replacing the set pJ with the
function f such that fI(1;:::;k) = k+1 for all tuples h1;:::;k;k+1i in pJ. This is a valid
deﬁnition of a function since we assume J j=
p CBL[Ff
p ^ UCp; p;c], from which it follows that
J j=
p UCp. Clearly, J = If
p so it only remains to be shown that I j=
p CBL[F; f;c]. By the
deﬁnition of J
p
f, I [J j=
p (C11). Thus by Theorem 8, I [J j=
p CBL[F; f;c] $ CBL[Ff
p ; p;c].
From the assumption, we have J j=
p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c], and further I [ J j=
p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c].
Consequently, I [ J j=
p CBL[F; f;c], and since the signature of J does not contain f, we
conclude I j=
p CBL[F; f;c].
Part (b), Right-to-left: Take any I such that J = If
p and I j=
p CBL[F; f;c]. By the deﬁnition
of J = If
p, I [ J j= p (C11). Thus by Theorem 8, I [ J j= p CBL[F; f;c] $ CBL[Ff
p ; p;c].
Since we assume I j=
p CBL[F; f;c], it is the case that I [ J j=
p CBL[F; f;c] and thus it must
be the case that I [ J j= p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c]. Further, (C11) entails UCp, so I [ J j=
p UCp. Since
the signature of I does not contain p, we conclude J j=
p CBL[Ff
p ; p;c] ^ UCp and since UCp is
comprised of constraints, J j=
p CBL[Ff
p ^ UCp; p;c].
Corollary 3 Let c be a set of intensional constants consisting of intensional function constants
f and intensional predicate constants, and let F be an c-plain sentence. (a) For any total inter-
pretation I of the signature of F, I j= p CBL[F;c] iff If
p j= SM[Ff
p ^ UCp;cf
p]. (b) For any
total interpretation J of the signature of Ff
p, J j= SM[Ff
p ^ UCp;cf
p] iff J = If
p for some total
interpretation I such that I j= p CBL[F;c].
Proof. (a) First, by multiple applications of Corollary 2, it follows that for any total interpreta-
tion I of the signature of F, I j=
p CBL[F;c] iff If
p j=
p CBL[Ff
p ^ UCp;cf
p]. Then the statement
follows from Theorem 5 since Ff
p ^ UCp is c-plain.
The proof of (b) is similar.
C.8 Proof of Theorem 9
Given a program , by FOL we denote the FOL representation of .
3 The last step is justiﬁed by the theorem on constraints, similar to Theorem 3 from (Ferraris et al. 2011), which we omit
here.16
Lemma 14
Consider a signature  and a set of constants c. Given an ASPffg program  of signature  not
containing strong negation,
(a) For any partial interpretation I of signature  that maps every constant in  n c to itself,
there is a consistent set S of seed literals such that I j= p FOL iff S j= b .
(b) For any consistent set of seed literals S, there is a partial interpretation I such that I j= p
FOL iff S j=
b .
Proof. Part (a): Given a partial interpretation I, let S be the set ff(v) = w : f(v)I = wg [
fp(v) : p(v)I = TRUEg. We note that this is a consistent set of seed literals since a partial
interpretation maps f(v) to at most one object constant.
We also note that by the deﬁnition of S, for any atomic sentence A, we have I j=
p A iff S j=
b A.
Now, consider any rule r from . I j=
p rFOL iff I j=
p head(r)FOL or I 6j=
p body(r)FOL. By the
previous observation, this is equivalent to S j=
b head(r) or S 6j=
b body(r) since body(r) is a
conjunction of atomic formulas. This is precisely the deﬁnition of S j=
b r.
Part (b): Given a consistent set of seed literals S, let I be the partial interpretation deﬁned as
follows:
 for every object constant v 2  n c, we have vI = v.
 for every predicate constant p 2 c and every list of object constants v, we have p(v)I =
TRUE iff p(v) 2 S.
 for every function constant f 2 c and every list of object constants v, we have f(v)I = u
if S does not mention f(v), and f(v)I = w if f(v) = w is in S.
We note that the last bullet is well-deﬁned since S is a consistent set of seed literals so that
there cannot be two distinct object constants a and b such that f(v) = a 2 S and f(v) = b 2 S.
We also note that by the deﬁnition of I, for any atomic sentence A, we have I j=
p A iff
S j=
b A. Now, consider any rule r from . S j=
b r iff S j=
b head(r) or S 6j=
b body(r). By the
previous observation, this is equivalent to I j=
p head(r)FOL or I 6j=
p body(r)FOL since body(r)
is a conjunction of atomic formulas. This is precisely the deﬁnition of I j=
p rFOL.
The proof of Lemma 14 tells us that a consistent set of seed literals can be identiﬁed with a
partial interpretation.
Lemma 15
For consistents sets of seed literals J and I of the same signature, J is a proper subset of I iff
J c I (as deﬁned in Section 2.3.2) when we view them as partial interpretations.
Proof. We ﬁrst note that since consistent sets of literals map every object constant in  n c to
itself, the partial interpretation view does the same which corresponds to the ﬁrst condition for
J c I. The second condition of J c I is pJ  pI for all predicate constants in c, which
corresponds exactly to the predicate part of J being a subset of the predicate part of I. Finally,
the third condition of J c I is fJ() = u or fJ() = fI() corresponds to the function part
of J being a subset of the function part of I since we identify a partial interpretation mapping an
element to u to the absence of that element in the set.
Theorem 9 For any ASPffg program  with intensional constants c and any consistent set I
of seed literals, if  has no strong negation, then I is a Balduccini answer set of  iff I j=
p
CBL[;c].17
Proof. BydeﬁnitionandbyusingtheequivalentreformulationpresentedandjustiﬁedinLemma15
and Lemma 14, I is a Balduccini answer set of a program  iff I j=
p  and for every partial in-
terpretation J such that J c I, we have J 6j=
p I. This is equivalent to the reduct reformulation
of the Cabalar semantics. Further, this is equivalent to I j= p CBL[FOL;c] by Theorem 2.
C.9 Proof of Theorem 10
Theorem 10 For any ASPffg program  with intensional constants c and any consistent set I
of seed literals, I is a Balduccini answer set of  iff I is a Balduccini answer set of #.
Proof. First, we show that I j=
b(f = g) iff I j=
b (f = f) ^ (g = g) ^ :(f = g).
Left-to-right: Assume I j=
b(f = g). By deﬁnition, I contains both f =c1 and g=c2 for some
object constants c1 and c2 such that c1 6= c2. Clearly, each of I j= f = f, I j= g = g and
I 6j= f = g holds.
Right-to-left: I j=
b (f = f) ^ (g = g) ^ :(f = g). Since I j=
b f = f and I j= g = g, it follows
that I contains f = c1 and I contains f = c2 for some c1 and c2. Further, since I j= :(f = g),
it must be that c1 6= c2, from which the claim follows.
From this it is not difﬁcult to check that I is equivalent to (#)I under partial satisfaction,
from which the claim follows.
C.10 Proof of Theorem 11
Theorem 11 For any sentence F in Clark normal form that is tight on c and any total inter-
pretation I, if I j= 9xy(x 6= y), then I j=
p CBL[F;c] iff I j= SM[F;c] iff I is a model of the
completion of F relative to c.
Proof. By Theorem 2 from (Bartholomew and Lee 2013), I is a model of the completion of F
relative to c iff I j= SM[F;c]. Since a formula in Clark normal form that is tight on c is also
head-c-plain and is tight on c, I j= SM[F;c] iff I j=
p CBL[F;c] by Theorem 6.
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